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It is a consequence of both Kennedy and McNally’s (2005) typology of the scale
structures of gradable adjectives and Kennedy’s (2007) economy principle that an ob-
ject is clean just in case its degree of cleanness is maximal. So they jointly predict
that the sentence ‘Both towels are clean, but the red one is cleaner than the blue one’
(Rotstein and Winter 2004) is a contradiction. Surely, one can account for the sen-
tence’s assertability by saying that the first instance of ‘clean’ is used loosely: Since
‘clean’ pragmatically conveys the property of being close to maximally clean rather
than the property of being maximally clean, the sentence as a whole conveys a con-
sistent proposition. I challenge this semantics-pragmatics package by considering the
sentence ‘Mary believes that both towels are clean but that the red one is cleaner than
the blue one’. We can certainly use this sentence to attribute a coherent belief to Mary:
One of its readings says that she believes that the towels are clean by a contextually
salient standard (e.g. the speaker’s); the other says that she believes that the towels are
clean by her own standard. I argue that Kennedy’s semantics-pragmatics package can’t
deliver those readings, and propose that we drop the economy principle and account
for those readings semantically by assigning to the belief sentence two distinct truth
conditions. I consider two ways to deliver those truth-conditions. The first one posits
world-variables in the sentence’s logical form and analyzes those truth-conditions as re-
sulting from two binding possibilities of those variables. The second one proposes that
the threshold function introduced by the phonologically null morpheme pos is shiftable
in belief contexts.
1 Introduction
Let us assume with Kennedy (2007) that every gradable adjective denotes a measure func-
tion that maps the objects in its domain onto a set of degrees that are ordered on a scale,
and that every gradable adjective in its positive form is preceded by a phonologically null
morpheme (pos for ‘positive form’) that converts that adjective’s measure function into
a property of individuals.1 This paper focuses on the question: When are the positive
forms of maximal standard gradable adjectives (GAmax) — gradable adjectives whose scales
have maximal endpoints (e.g. ‘flat’, ‘certain’, and ‘clean’)2 — true of their arguments?
We can define two views on that question. According to the absolutist view, a GAmax
(in its positive form) is true of its argument just in case its measure function maps that
argument to the maximal endpoint of its scale:3
(1) The absolutist analysis of GAmax:
Jpos GAmaxKc(a) = 1 iff JGAmaxKc(a) = max(JGAmaxK),
where max(JGAmaxK) is the maximal endpoint of the scale of GAmax
Since no ordinary objects have the properties expressed by GAmax to the maximal degree,
this view entails that simple unnegated sentences containing GAmax (e.g. ‘my hands are
clean’) are always false. To explain their assertability, this view weakens Grice’s maxim
of Quality — which says that we are required to say what we believe to be true — into a
principle that says that we are only required to say what we believe to be close enough to
true.4
According to the relativist view, a GAmax (in its positive form) is true of its argument
just in case its measure function maps that argument to a degree that is sufficiently close
1We are not going to discuss the Kleinian analyses (e.g. Klein 1980, Burnett 2014) on which the basic meaning
of a gradable adjective is a property of individuals rather than a measure function.
2Here I deliberately depart from Syrett et al.’s (2009) usage of the same term, on which GAmax are so called
because their contextual thresholds always coincide with their scales’ maximal endpoints.
3For variants of this view, see Unger (1975), Lasersohn (1999), Kennedy and McNally (2005), and Kennedy
(2007).
4For a similar move, see Klecha (2018) who weakens Quality into a principle he calls faithfulness, which says,
roughly, that the difference between semantic content and pragmatically conveyed content should be negligible.
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to the maximal endpoint of its scale, and what counts as sufficiently close varies from
context to context:5
(2) The relativist analysis of GAmax:
Jpos GAmaxKc(a) = 1 iff JGAmaxKc(a) ≈c max(JGAmaxK),
where ‘x ≈c y’ reads: x counts as sufficient close to y in context c
Since predicating a GAmax of its argument only requires that argument to have the prop-
erty expressed by that GAmax to a sufficiently high (but possibly non-maximal) degree,
this view holds that simple unnegated sentences containing GAmax can be true, and so no
departure from Quality is needed to explain their assertability.
In this paper, I defend a relativist-friendly modification to Kennedy’s (2007) account
of gradable adjectives, which happens to fall in the absolutist’s camp. I will focus on the
first example below, given by Rotstein and Winter (2004), and the result of embedding it
inside belief contexts:
(3) Both towels are clean, but the red one is cleaner than the blue one.
(4) Mary believes that both towels are clean but that the red one is cleaner than the
blue one.
Here is why (3) and (4) are interesting. It follows from the absolutist analysis that (3) is
a contradiction because both towels must have the maximal degree of cleanness in order
to be clean, but if so, the red one can’t have a higher degree of cleanness than the blue
one. Of course, the absolutist need not be deterred by this result because they could say
that the sentence, while false, is close enough to true to be assertable. This is where (4)
comes in. While it can be read as an attribution of a contradictory belief to Mary, it has
two readings on which it attributes a coherent belief to her: The first attributes to her
a belief whose content is based on a contextually salient standard of cleanness, such as
the speaker’s; the second attributes to her a belief whose content is based on her own
standard of cleanness, which the speaker may not know.
These two readings, which I call the public-standard reading and private-standard reading,
pose a challenge to the absolutist: If the semantic content of (3) (hereafter the clean-cleaner
sentence) is always a contradiction, then the absolutist can’t account for those readings
by assigning two distinct truth conditions to (4) (hereafter the clean-cleaner belief sentence).
It appears that their only options are the pragmatic ones, such as appealing to Laser-
sohn’s (1999) theory of loose talk. But I argue that the pragmatic options are unlikely to
work. Ultimately, I will propose that we drop the economy principle (to be discussed),
which is responsible for the absolutist commitment of Kennedy’s account of gradable
adjectives. The major benefit of my proposal is that, since it does not hold that the clean-
cleaner sentence always expresses a contradiction, it can straightforwardly account for the
coherent-belief readings of the clean-cleaner belief sentence by assigning to it two distinct
truth conditions.
I will provide two analyses that can plausibly generate those truth conditions (but
leave the task of choosing between them to future research). Let me sketch those analyses
here before we discuss them in more detail below. On both of them, the public-private
ambiguity is traced to the pos-morpheme preceding the instance of ‘clean’ in the first
conjunct of the embedded clean-cleaner sentence — that is, not to the comparative instance
of ‘clean’ in the second conjunct of the embedded sentence. So, for simplicity, let’s focus
on the belief sentence below:
(SPorky) Mary believes (that) Porky (is) pos clean
The first analysis posits world arguments in both the adjective ‘clean’ and the pos-morpheme
so that both the measure function (contributed by the adjective) and the threshold (con-
tributed by the pos-morpheme) can vary from world to world. This analysis delivers
the public-standard reading of SPorky by having the world-variable at the pos-morpheme
bound ‘long distance’ by a variable binder on top of that sentence, and delivers the private-
standard reading of SPorky by having the world-variable at the pos-morpheme bound lo-
cally by a variable binder on top of the embedded sentence (i.e. Porky is clean). More
concretely, it assigns the following structures and truth-conditions to SPorky (Note: The
meaning of ‘believe’ asks for three inputs: a world, a proposition, and an individual; scclean
is a threshold function, given by context c, that maps a world to the threshold degree for
5For views in this neighborhood, see Lewis (1979), McNally (2011), Sassoon and Toledo (2011, 2011). But note
that none of these accounts explicitly require that the argument of a GAmax has the property expressed by that
adjective to a near-maximal degree.
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‘clean’ at that world; g is a variable assignment function that maps a world-variable to a
world and an individual-variable to an individual):
(5) Public-standard reading:
a. LF1: λw0 Mary believesw0 [λw1 Porky posw0 cleanw1 ]
b. JLF1Kc,g = λw0. believes(w0 , λu. clean(p)(u) ≥ scclean(w0),m)
(6) Private-standard reading:
a. LF2: λw0 Mary believesw0 [λw1 Porky posw1 cleanw1 ]
b. JLF2Kc,g = λw0. believes(w0 , λu. clean(p)(u) ≥ scclean(u),m)
The second analysis is mainly motivated by the concern that, on the private-standard
reading, the clean-threshold(s) in the worlds compatible with Mary’s beliefs should be
entirely determined by her own doxastic state, rather than partially by the context via
the threshold function scclean as on (6-b). To address this concern, the second analysis
represents Mary’s doxastic state with a set of centered worlds each of which contains (at
least) a world and a threshold function, and accounts for the public-private ambiguity
by introducing an optional ‘monstrous’ operation, such that when that operation is not
turned on, the threshold function(s) is fixed by the context (resulting the public-standard
reading), and when that operation is turned on, the threshold function(s) is fixed by the
centered worlds compatible with Mary’s beliefs (resulting the private-standard reading).
Our discussion below is structured as follows. In the next section (§2), I review
Kennedy’s account of gradable adjectives, trace its absolutist commitment to the econ-
omy principle, and examine some data that purport to support the truth conditions de-
termined by the principle. After that, I distinguish between the public-standard reading
and the private-standard reading of the clean-cleaner belief sentence, and present my ob-
jection to the absolutist (§3). Since Lasersohn’s theory is probably the most sophisticated
theory of the pragmatics of loose talk, I will then discuss why the absolutist can’t ac-
count for the two coherent-belief readings of the clean-cleaner belief sentence by using
his theory (§4). After that, I consider Sassoon and Toledo’s (2011, 2011) account of GAmax
(§5). Their account is of particular interest because it has the potential to salvage a weak-
ened version of the absolutist analysis, as well as to deliver the coherent-belief readings
of the clean-cleaner belief sentence. The problems with Lasersohn’s and Sassoon and
Toledo’s accounts inform my proposal (§6-8): §6 proposes how the contextual thresholds
for GAmax are determined (if not by the economy principle); §7-8 present the two analyses
of the private-public ambiguity we sketched above. §9 concludes.
2 Kennedy on Gradable Adjectives and Interpretive Econ-
omy
Kennedy (2007) proposes that the meaning of a gradable adjective is a measure function
that maps the objects in its domain onto a set of degrees that are ordered on a scale
along a certain dimension, such as height and cleanness. For example, the meaning of
‘tall’ is a function that maps Porky and Esther to their heights on the tall scale. This
meaning straightforwardly accounts for the truth conditions of the comparative form,
such as ‘Porky is taller than Esther’: The sentence is true just in case Porky’s height is
higher than Esther’s height.
According to Kennedy and McNally (2005), there are four types of adjectival scales.
As we can see below, their classification is supported by the distributions of the modifiers
‘slightly’ and ‘perfectly’. We should also notice that GAmax (e.g. ‘clean’) have the second
scale structure below:
(7) a. Totally open-scales ( ) :
{??slightly, ??perfectly} tall/ short, expensive/ inexpensive
b. Partially-closed scales with maximal endpoints ( ] :
{??slightly, perfectly} flat, clean, dry, certain
c. Partially-closed scales with minimal endpoints [ ) :
{slightly, ??perfectly} bumpy, dirty, wet, uncertain
d. Totally-closed scales [ ] :
{slightly, perfectly} transparent/ opaque
Since no theory of gradable adjectives is complete without an account of the truth con-
ditions of the positive form, such as ‘Porky is tall’, crucial to Kennedy’s theory is his
account of how the four scale structures above determine the truth conditions of the pos-
itive form. There are two elements in his account. The first element is a mechanism
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that converts the measure function denoted by a gradable adjective into that adjective’s
positive-form meaning, which is a set. Kennedy posits a phonologically null morpheme
(pos) whose meaning maps the measure function denoted by an adjective to that adjec-
tive’s positive-form meaning. The key idea behind this conversion strategy is that the
pos-morpheme introduces a contextual threshold, such that if an object’s degree (e.g. its
degree of tallness) measured by a certain gradable adjective (e.g. ‘tall’) is at least as high as
that threshold, that object falls into the set denoted by the positive form of that adjective.
Shown below is how the meaning of the pos-morpheme converts the measure function of
‘tall’ into that adjective’s positive-form meaning:
(8) a. JtallK = λx. tall(x), where tall(x) is x’s degree of tallness.
b. JposK = λg〈e,d〉. λx. g(x) ≥ s(g), where s is a contextually given function that
maps a gradable adjective g to its contextual threshold s(g).
c. JposK(JtallK) = λx.tall(x) ≥ s(JtallK)
[(a) & (b), Function Application]
As we can see in (8-b), the pos-morpheme introduces a contextually given function s
that maps a gradable adjective g to its contextual threshold s(g). A natural question can
be raised about how that function is chosen. The answer Kennedy proposes is that it is
chosen in such a way that the objects of which a gradable adjective (in its positive form) is
true ‘stand out’ (against the objects of which that adjective is false) in terms of the degree
to which they have the property measured by that adjective (2007, p.17).6
Kennedy does not intend this to be the complete answer for adjectives with closed
scales (e.g. ‘clean’, ‘full’) because if no additional constraints are put on the contextual
threshold for ‘full’, then even a half-full bus can stand out in terms of its fullness when the
contextual threshold is low enough — and a similar worry applies to adjectives with to-
tally closed scales (e.g. transparent).7 So Kennedy proposes additional constraints on the
contextual thresholds for adjectives with closed scales. Those constraints and Kennedy’s
reduction of them to a single constraint constitute the second element of his account of
the positive form.
The constraints Kennedy proposes are as follows: The contextual threshold for an
adjective whose scale has a maximal endpoint (e.g. ‘clean’, ‘full’, ‘transparent’) is always
the scale’s maximal endpoint. And the contextual threshold for an adjective whose scale
has a minimal endpoint (e.g. ‘dirty’, ‘transparent’) is always the degree that is minimally
above the scale’s minimal endpoint — call that degree the least non-zero degree.8 These
constraints are supposed to apply simultaneously to adjectives with totally closed scales
(e.g. transparent) so that their contextual thresholds can be either their scales’ maximal
endpoints or their scales’ least non-zero degrees. The following is the resulting truth
conditions for adjectives with closed scales:
(9) a. Partially-closed scales with maximal endpoints ( ]
(e.g. flat, clean, dry, certain):
pos(g)(x) = 1 iff g(x) = max(g) = s(g),
where pos(g) is the positive-form meaning of the adjective g, max(g) is the
maximal endpoint of the scale of g, and s(g) is the contextual threshold of g.
b. Partially-closed scales with minimal endpoints [ )
(e.g. bumpy, dirty, wet, uncertain):
pos(g)(x) = 1 iff g(x) ≥ s(g) >min min(g),
where min(g) is the minimal endpoint of the scale of g, and ‘x >min y’ reads:
x is minimally above y.
c. Totally-closed scales [ ]
(e.g. transparent, opaque):
pos(g)(x) = 1 iff g(x) = max(g) = s(g) or g(x) ≥ s(g) >min min(g)
Since the truth conditions of these adjectives are always based either on their scales’ max-
imal endpoints or least non-zero degrees, Kennedy calls them absolute adjectives. Kennedy
distinguishes them from adjectives with open scales (e.g. ‘tall’) whose contextual thresh-
olds can be anywhere along their scales — he calls those adjectives relative adjectives. But
6One of the motivations for the notion of standing out is to explain the crisp judgment effect, where ‘the
positive form cannot be felicitously used to distinguish between two objects that differ only very slightly in
some gradable property’ (Kennedy 2007, p.19).
7Kennedy (2007, pp.21-22) suggests that additional constraints are needed on the contextual thresholds for
minimal standard closed-scale adjectives as well. According to him, ‘The gold is impure’ never requires the gold
to have a degree of impurity that is higher than the least non-zero degree on the impure-scale; it only requires
the gold’s degree of impurity to be non-zero. See §6 for more discussion on this issue.
8See Kennedy (2007, p.26, example 43).
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since what is at issue in this paper is whether adjectives with closed scales are absolute,
we will use the more theory-neutral terms of closed-scale adjectives and open-scale adjectives
in place of ‘absolute adjectives’ and ‘relative adjectives’. We’ll call closed-scale adjectives
with minimal endpoints (e.g. ‘dirty’) minimal standard gradable adjectives (GAmin), and
closed-scale adjectives with both minimal endpoints and maximal endpoints (e.g. trans-
parent) minimal/ maximal standard gradable adjectives (GAmin/max).
Kennedy argues that the truth conditions of closed-scale adjectives (stated in (9)) fol-
low from a more general principle about semantic processing, which says that participants
in a discourse ought to maximize the role of the conventional meanings of the words in the
sentences they use, and minimize the role of the context in computing the truth conditions
of their sentences. Here is Kennedy’s statement of the principle:
(10) The Economy Principle:
Maximize the contribution of the conventional meanings of the elements of a sen-
tence to the computation of its truth conditions. (Kennedy 2007, p.36)
At first glance, there seems to be a gap between the principle and the truth conditions
of closed-scale adjectives. The conventional meanings of those adjectives are most plau-
sibly the measure functions (and the scale structures) they encode. And the conventional
meaning of pos, as we saw in (8-b), is only responsible for converting a measure function
into a set whose membership depends on the contextually given threshold function. The
crucial issue here is whether those conventional meanings ensure that when the scale of
an adjective is closed, the threshold function is chosen in such a way that the resulting
contextual threshold coincides with that scale’s maximal endpoint (that scale’s least non-
zero degree) so that we obtain the truth conditions in (9). But the conventional meanings
of closed-scale adjectives and of pos seem silent on how the threshold function should be
chosen: Given that both the maximal endpoint and the least non-zero degree are points
on their scales just like other degrees on their scales, it is not clear why the conventional
meanings of closed-scale adjectives and of pos should privilege those degrees.
Perhaps some elaboration on the idea that those degrees are natural thresholds on their
scales (which Kennedy calls ‘natural transitions’) can explain those degrees’ privileged
status.9 Perhaps not. For the sake of streamlining our discussion, let’s assume that the
apparent gap between the economy principle and the truth conditions stated in (9) is
easily bridgeable. Let’s call those truth conditions economy truth-conditions for ‘the truth
conditions of closed-scale adjectives determined by the economy principle’.
Before we continue, let’s make explicit why Kennedy’s theory falls into the absolutist’s
camp: Based on Kennedy and McNally’s (2005) typology, GAmax (e.g. ‘clean’) encode
scales that have maximal endpoints. Although their conventional meanings (and the con-
ventional meaning of pos) leave their contextual thresholds open, the economy principle
guarantees that their contextual thresholds coincide with their scales’ maximal endpoints
so that they (in their positive forms) are true of their arguments just in case those argu-
ments possess the properties they express to the maximal degree. This just is the absolutist
analysis.
In the rest of this section, we examine some data that purport to support the economy
truth-conditions.
Syrett et al. (2009) have found that, when presented with a request like the following
sentence and two objects with different lengths, which have been judged to be either both
long or both not long in an independent task, their adult subjects systematically interpret
it as a felicitous request for the longer of the two objects.
(11) Please give me the long one.
But when the subjects are presented with a request like the following sentence and two
partially-filled jars, they find the request infelicitous. They only accept the request when
one jar is full and the other is about 2/3 full.
(12) Please give me the full one.
These findings appear to support the economy truth-conditions: Since the economy prin-
ciple favors a maximal-standard interpretation for ‘full’ but puts no constraints on the
contextual threshold for the open-scale adjective ‘long’, the subjects were unwilling to
shift the contextual threshold for ‘full’ to the degree that marks 2/3 full, but willing to
shift the contextual threshold for ‘long’ so that the description ‘the long one’ is true of
9Based on the idea that those degrees mark certain ‘natural transitions’ on their scales, Kennedy argues that
those two degrees are in fact privileged by the conventional meanings of closed-scale adjectives. See Kennedy
(2007, pp.31-32, p.37) for his argument, which I do not attempt to reconstruct here.
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only one of the test items.
However, these findings aren’t conclusive. Syrett et al. (2009, p.27) acknowledge the
possibility that, had the fuller jar been closer to full without being noticeably full, the sub-
jects would have been willing to adopt a non-maximal contextual threshold. Of course,
this possibility is consistent with the economy truth conditions because the subjects’ will-
ingness to adopt a non-maximal contextual threshold can be explained in terms of the
pragmatics of loose talk (Lasersohn 1999; to be discussed). But their acknowledgment
suggests an alternative interpretation of their findings: Contrary to what the economy
principle predicts, the contextual thresholds of GAmax do shift, but their shifts are more
restricted than those of the contextual thresholds of open-scale adjectives.
We turn now to some (in)consistency claims that purport to support the economy
truth-conditions. The following is predicted by the economy principle because if the glass
is full, it is maximally full and cannot be fuller, and if the countertop is less dry than the
floor, then it isn’t maximally dry and is hence not dry:
(13) #My glass is FULL, but it could be fuller. (Kennedy 2007, 45a)
(14) a. The floor is drier than the countertop. (Kennedy 2007, 50a) 
b. The countertop is not dry. (Kennedy 2007, 50b)
However, these patterns don’t seem to hold generally. Rotstein and Winter’s clean-cleaner
sentence is a clear counterexample to both: The already clean blue towel could be cleaner;
although the red towel is cleaner than the blue towel, the blue towel is clean. Other
counterexamples include rice bowls, which are conventionally regarded as full if they are
filled roughly up to the rims, but which can certainly be fuller, thanks to the stickiness of
rice.1011
The following entailment claim has also been said to lend support to the economy
truth-conditions:
(15) The table is not wet  The table is dry. (Kennedy 2007, 47b)
This is why those truth conditions predict this entailment. ‘Dry’ and ‘wet’ share the same
partially-closed scale, with the maximal endpoint of the dry-scale being identical to the
minimal endpoint of the wet-scale. So if the table is not wet, its degree of wetness must
coincide with the minimal endpoint of the wet-scale (identical to the maximal endpoint of
the dry-scale), which means that it is dry. However, our judgment about this entailment
may vary with the object referred to in the example and the context. For example, Rotstein
and Winter (2004, p.265) observe that: ‘in some contexts a moist towel may be deemed
neither wet nor dry’. Similarly, a rag we use for general cleaning may be considered
neither dirty nor clean. So this entailment doesn’t seem to hold generally.
We have reviewed Kennedy’s account of gradable adjectives, traced its absolutist com-
mitment to the economy principle, and examined the extent to which the truth conditions
determined by the principle are supported by experimental and linguistic evidence. We
now proceed to our objection to the absolutist analysis.
3 A Challenge to the Absolutist
The absolutist analysis tends to go hand in hand with the pragmatics of loose talk because
the latter fends off apparent counterexamples to the former. For example, as we just
mentioned, Syrett et al. (2009, pp.28-29) explain the possibility that their adult subjects
are willing to adopt a non-maximal interpretation for ‘full’ by suggesting that while the
adjective’s actual denotation is false of the fuller jar, the subjects assign to the adjective
an alternative denotation, close enough to its actual denotation, that is true of the fuller
jar. Kennedy and McNally (2005) give a similar explanation for the assertability of the
following sentences:
(16) a. The gas tank is full, but you can still top it off. It’s not completely full yet.
(Kennedy and McNally 2005, 33b)
b. (There are a few people in a theatre with a lot of empty seats) The theatre is
empty tonight. (Kennedy and McNally 2005, 33c)
10See also McNally’s (2011) example of wine glasses: Wine glasses are said to be full when they are filled up
to the fill-line, but they can be fuller.
11One may attempt to block these counterexamples by placing focal stress on the adjectives in their positive
form because, as Kennedy (2007) and Unger (1975) observe, focal stress blocks the imprecise (loose) interpreta-
tions of the adjectives. However, since we can’t antecedently assume that the blocked imprecise interpretations
are not among the possible semantic contents of the adjectives, we can’t restrict the data to sentences with focal
stress placed on the adjectives in their positive form.
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They suggest that although both sentences are false,12 they are assertable because they are
‘close enough to true’.
But I argue that these false-but-true-enough style explanations are unattractive and
can’t be relied upon to fend off counterexamples to the absolutist analysis. Consider the
clean-cleaner sentence and the clean-cleaner belief sentence, which I repeat here:
(17) Both towels are clean, but the red one is cleaner than the blue one.13
(18) Mary believes that both towels are clean but that the red one is cleaner than the
blue one.
The absolutist analysis predicts that (17) is a contradiction because since both towels
must have the maximal degree of cleanness in order to be clean, the red one can’t have
a higher degree of cleanness than the blue one. It is true that the absolutist could say
that (17) is again false but close enough to true. But notice that the result of embedding
(17) in a belief context, such as (18), can be used to attribute coherent beliefs to a belief
subject, and it has two coherent-belief readings (besides its contradictory-belief reading).
The problem with the false-but-true-enough style explanation is that it can’t account for
both readings, or so I argue.
Let’s distinguish between the two coherent-belief readings with the following scenar-
ios:
(19) Mary and I are employees of a towel cleaning company where a towel counts
as clean if it has been boiled and disinfected 5 times, and the cleaner a towel is
the more we charge our customers for cleaning it. Mary mistakenly believes that
she has cleaned the red towel 6 times and the blue towel 5 times, while in fact
she has only cleaned each towel 4 times. Acting on her false belief, she tells her
customer that the towels are ready for pick-up, and that she will charge him more
for cleaning the red one than for cleaning the blue one. If asked by my boss why
Mary acted the way she did, I could respond: She believes that both towels are
clean and that the red one is cleaner. My response is apt because it conveys that
Mary believes that both towels are clean by the company’s (or my boss’s) standard.
Notice that Mary’s own standard of cleanness is irrelevant to the truth value of
my utterance because my utterance would still be true if Mary’s own standard of
cleanness were a lot higher than the company’s and my boss’s.
(20) Mary is absent from work today. On the TV, we see her cleaning a pig’s face with
the blue towel but save the red towel for herself. Mary is an animal lover, so we
know that she would not have used the blue towel on the pig unless she thinks
that it is clean. So the reason for her behavior must be that while she thinks that
both towels are clean, she wants to save the cleaner towel for herself. I can convey
this explanation by uttering (18). Unlike in the last scenario, Mary’s own standard
of cleanness is relevant to the truth value of my utterance because my utterance
of (18) is likely to be judged false if Mary says that she doesn’t really find the blue
towel clean. But notice that while Mary’s own standard of cleanness is relevant to
the truth value (18), my utterance of (18) is acceptable even if I don’t know how
high that standard is.
These two readings, which I call the public-standard reading and the private-standard
reading, concern how the positive forms of gradable adjectives are interpreted when they
are embedded under belief contexts. While my argument focuses on GAmax (e.g. ‘clean’),
other closed-scale adjectives (e.g. ‘dirty’) and open-scale adjectives (e.g. tall) display the
same ambiguity when they are embedded under belief contexts. For example, suppose
Mary has a highly inflated standard of tallness, but she mistakenly believes that the 6’9
tall Isaiah Thomas is 6’11. Suppose as well that we are trying to look for some tall people
to join our basketball team, and that 6’10 or above is tall enough for us. Since Mary
believes that Isaiah is 6’11, she recommends him to us. Among ourselves, we can explain
Mary’s mistake by uttering ‘she mistakenly believes that Isaiah is tall’, even though Mary
may not think to herself that Isaiah is tall. This is the public-standard reading. To get
the private-standard reading, we can imagine that Mary is a very competitive person
who only plays basketball with people she finds tall, and that we see from afar that she
is playing basketball with someone. I can explain Mary’s behavior by uttering ‘she must
believe that that person is tall’. The relevant standard of tallness here must be Mary’s own
12Notice that the absolutist analysis predicts (16-a) to be not only false but also contradictory like the clean-
cleaner sentence.
13Another example: “Andy and Baldy are definitely bald, but Andy is slightly balder by just a single hair.”
(Hu 2015; slightly modified).
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— rather than mine or my hearer’s — or I fail to explain why she is playing basketball
with that person.
My hunch is that we should account for this ambiguity semantically by assigning to
the belief sentences two distinct truth conditions. (We’ll consider two ways to do so in §7-
8.) But the absolutist can’t apply this strategy to the clean-cleaner belief sentence because
they are already committed to that sentence being a contradiction — and obviously we
can’t derive from a contradiction two distinct truth-conditions. So it seems they are only
left with the pragmatic options. But I am going to show that those options are unattractive
by focusing on Lasersohn’s theory of pragmatic halos.
4 Pragmatic Halos
One of the goals of Lasersohn’s theory is to make precise how some sentences (e.g. My
hands are clean) can be false but ‘close enough to true’.14 It achieves that goal by (i)
assigning to every expression both a regular (semantic) value and a pragmatic halo — a set
of values that are of the same type as that expression’s regular value but differs from it in
‘pragmatically ignorable’ ways; (ii) making every sentence’s regular value and (pragmatic)
halo compositionally derivable from the regular values and the halos of that sentence’s
parts; and (iii) defining a sentence that is false but close enough to true to be one that
has a false regular value and a halo that contains a true value. (We’ll call the values in a
pragmatic halo halo values.)
Let’s make explicit how Lasersohn’s theory works by focusing on the following simple
sentence:
(21) Porky (is) clean
We’ll make the simplifying assumption that gradable adjectives denote properties of indi-
viduals (rather than measure functions)15 and ignore intensionality for the moment. Let’s
suppose given the goals of our conversation, we find the difference between the prop-
erty of being maximally clean, clean, and the property of being close to maximally clean,
clean↓, to be pragmatically ignorable. The adjective ‘clean’, then, has the regular value
clean and the pragmatic halo {clean, ..., clean↓}. Since we probably can’t use the proper
name ‘Porky’ loosely, ‘Porky’ has, as both its regular value and its only halo value, Porky
himself (p). To obtain the regular value of (21) (which is the truth value TRUE if Porky is
maximally clean and FALSE otherwise), we combine the regular values of ‘Porky’ and of
‘clean’. To obtain the halo of (21), we apply each halo value of ‘(is) clean’ to the halo value
of ‘Porky’ and collect the results in a set.16 (That set, in this case, is the set of truth values
{clean(p), ..., clean↓(p)}.) We say that (21) is true just in case its regular value is TRUE,
and it is close enough to true just in case one of its halo values is TRUE.
Since the meaning of ‘believe’ is a relation between an individual and a proposition
(rather than a relation between an individual an a truth value), before we consider whether
the absolutist can use Lasersohn’s theory to give a pragmatic explanation for the two
coherent-belief readings of the clean-cleaner belief sentence, we need to upgrade sen-
tences’ regular values and halo values into intensions. Here is how we are going to do
so:
Step 1: We’ll continue to assume that the regular value (halo value) of a proper name
is an individual (singleton of individual), but we’ll upgrade other expressions’ regular
values and halo values into intensions. So, for example, the regular value of ‘clean’ is now
a function from worlds to properties of individuals:
(22) JcleanK =
λw. λx. clean(x)(w), which, for the absolutist, is identical to:
λw. λx. x is maximally clean in w
And the pragmatic halo of ‘clean’ is a set of values that are of the same type as (22) but
differs from it in pragmatically ignorable ways. Thanks to these upgrades, the regular
value of ‘Porky (is) clean’ is now the proposition that Porky is maximally clean, clean(p)
(i.e. the function that maps a world to TRUE just in case Porky is maximally clean in
that world), and its halo is a set that contains clean(p) and may contain the propositions
14Another is to make precise the semantics and the pragmatics of slack regulators, such as ‘perfectly’ and
‘exactly’. But the topic of slack regulation is beyond the scope of our discussion.
15This assumption is made because it simplifies the combinatorics and it avoids a potentially lengthy discus-
sion on whether the pos-morpheme or the adjective ‘clean’ has a non-singleton pragmatic halo (or both).
16The computation of a complex expression’s pragmatic halo is analogous to the computation of focus values
(Rooth 1985).
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that differ from clean(p) in pragmatically ignorable ways (i.e. the propositions that are
composed out of Porky (p) and the halo values of ‘clean’ that differ from clean in prag-
matically ignorable ways).
Step 2: Since the pragmatic halos of sentences are now sets of propositions (rather
than sets of truth values), we need to modify the criteria for truth and for ‘close enough
to true’ accordingly:
(23) Revised criteria for truth and for ‘close enough to true’:
A sentence is true in the context in which it is uttered if its regular value is true at
the world of that context,17 and it is close enough to true in that context if one of
its halo values is true at the world of that context.
Step 3: We’ll make two simplifying assumptions: First, we assume that only the positive
form of ‘clean’ can have more than one halo values. That is, we assume that the halo of
‘cleaner’ does not expand together with that of ‘clean’. (This assumption is analogous to
the fact that while the threshold for the tall scale can vary across contexts, the tall scale/
the tall measure function itself is context-invariant.) Second, we assume that the meaning
of ‘believe’ is as follows:
(24) JbelieveK = λw. λp〈s,t〉. λx. ∀w′[w′R(x)(w) → p(w′) = 1], where ‘w′R(x)(w)’
reads: w′ is a logically possible world compatible with the beliefs x has at world
w.
Notice that if we assume that the world variables in the metalanguage range over logically
possible worlds only, whenever believe holds between a world, a proposition, and an
individual, that proposition must be logically consistent.18
With these technicalities taken care of, I argue that while the absolutist might be able
to use Lasersohn’s theory to account for the public-standard reading of the clean-cleaner
belief sentence, they can’t use it to account for that sentence’s private-standard reading in
a satisfactory way.
Let’s begin with that sentence’s public-standard reading. Suppose we utter that sen-
tence in the context described in (19), intending the public-standard reading. Suppose,
as well, that clean↓ is the loose meaning of ‘clean’ that corresponds to our company’s (or
our boss’s) standard, and that Mary does mistakenly believe that the towels are clean by
our company’s standard and that the red one is cleaner. Let’s assume for the sake of ar-
gument that we find the difference between the property of being maximally clean, clean,
and clean↓ to be pragmatically ignorable.19 Since the regular value of the embedded
clean-cleaner sentence is a contradictory proposition, which we denote as ⊥, the regular
value of the belief sentence is believe(⊥)(m), and so the belief sentence is false in our con-
text, contrary to intuition. But the belief sentence is close enough to true in our context
because the proposition based on clean↓ — i.e. believe...(clean↓)...(m) — is a member of
the halo of the belief sentence, and that proposition is true at the world of our context.
Since the belief sentence has a close-to-truth value (i.e. not its regular truth value) that is
intuitively correct, the absolutist can reasonably argue that its intuitive truth-conditions
are encoded by its halo values (though not by its regular values).
We turn now to the private-standard reading of the belief sentence. Suppose we utter
that sentence in the context described in (20), intending the private-standard reading. We
know that the sentence has, as its regular value, believe(⊥)(m), and so it is again false
in our context. Can the absolutist argue that the intuitive truth-conditions of the belief
sentence are encoded by its halo values?
To focus on the worry that I think is most troubling for the absolutist, let us assume
that the intuitive truth-conditions of the belief sentence are indeed encoded by its halos
values. That is, we assume that Mary has in mind a single standard of cleanness;20 that
17Here I assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between contexts of utterance and formal (Kapla-
nian) contexts, each of which is a n-tuple containing at least a world coordinate.
18Admittedly, one may object that believe as defined in (24) isn’t the ‘real’ meaning of ‘believe’ because we can
truly report someone as having a contradictory belief. In response, if we want to account for the contradictory-
belief reading of the clean-cleaner sentence, we do need to introduce a meaning of ‘believe’ that allows a subject
to believe contradictions. But doing so will get us into the difficult topic of impossible worlds (Hintikka 1979,
Halpern and Pucella 2007, Nolan 2013), which goes beyond the scope of this paper. Since we are primarily
interested in the coherent-belief readings of the clean-cleaner sentence, and since, as far as I can see, the ‘real’
meaning of ‘believe’ won’t help the absolutist/ halo theorist answer our challenge (§3), I think we can be
contented with using believe as defined in (24).
19Since the goal of our uttering the belief sentence is to attribute a coherent-belief to Mary rather than to
attribute a contradictory belief to her or to make the contradictory claim that Mary consistently believes a
contradiction, it is not so clear that we must find the difference between clean and clean↓ to be pragmatically
ignorable.
20If Mary is undecided between multiples standard of cleanness, the halo theorist may have to assign multiple
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the loose meaning clean?% corresponds to Mary’s standard; and that — perhaps due to
Mary’s salience — the halo of ‘clean’ just is {clean, ..., clean?%} and so it tracks Mary’s
standard.
My worry is that even if the intuitive truth-conditions of the belief sentence are en-
coded by its halos values, if we are ignorant of Mary’s standard (which we can be when
we assert the private-standard reading), we cannot know that our utterance of that sen-
tence conveys such truth-conditions, and so it is difficult to see how we can rationally
intend to speak both truly and informatively (i.e. not unduly uninformatively) by utter-
ing that sentence, which we clearly can.
Let me elaborate. It seems reasonable to assume that we can rationally intend to speak
truthfully and informatively by uttering the belief sentence (and intending the private-
standard reading). To make sure that this assumption is not overly demanding for the
absolutist (who holds that the belief sentence is false),21 let us assume that we can speak
truthfully and informatively by uttering the belief sentence so long as it is close enough
to true. Now, recall from §3 that a defining feature of the private-standard reading is that
we need not know what Mary’s standard of cleanness is. The problem for the absolutist
is that if we don’t know what Mary’s standard is, there is no guarantee that we can speak
truly and informatively by uttering the belief sentence because we don’t know how much
slack we should give to the meaning of ‘clean’: If there is too little slack, our belief sentence
conveys (via its halo values) a false proposition; but if there is too much slack, our belief
sentence conveys (via its halo values) a proposition that is weaker than the proposition
based on clean?%.
Because of this worry, I think that the absolutist who endorses the pragmatic halo
theory at least fails to account for the private-standard reading satisfactorily. While I
can’t consider every possible pragmatic option available to the absolutist, I hope our
discussion on the halo theory helps us see that the pragmatic, false-but-true-enough style
explanations cannot be easily extended to account for the intuitive truth-conditions of
GAmax in belief contexts. With this in mind, we turn now to a semantic option, due to
Sassoon and Toledo (2011, 2011), which weakens the absolutist analysis, but which has
better potential to account for the intuitive truth-conditions of GAmax in belief contexts.
5 Local Absolutism and Granularity Shifts
Sassoon and Toledo are well aware of the challenge Rotstein and Winter’s clean-cleaner
sentence poses to the absolutist: They share Rotstein and Winter’s judgment that the
clean-cleaner sentence is perfectly natural.22 They also argue using the following exam-
ples that the absolutist analysis of GAmax is problematic:23
(25) a. This kitchen knife is clean. (Cruse 1980)
b. This surgical instrument is clean. (Cruse 1980)
According to their judgment, the standard of cleanness relevant to the interpretation of
(25-a) is lower than that of (25-b), which is impossible if the contextual threshold for ‘clean’
is always maximal.
To account for these data and a host of other phenomena,24 they propose that the
contextual thresholds for GAmax do shift across contexts, but that they shift in a way
that respects the absolutist’s intuition that every GAmax (in its positive form) requires
its argument to have the property it expresses to the maximal degree. Their account is
highly relevant to our challenge to the absolutist because it has the potential to salvage
a weakened version of the absolutist analysis, as well as to deliver the coherent-belief
readings of the clean-cleaner belief sentence. So before I propose my relativist-friendly
halos to ‘clean’. But this move is likely to complicate their theory considerably.
21Recall that Mary in scenarios (19) and (20) doesn’t have a contradictory belief.
22See Toledo and Sassoon (2011, pp.139-140). But they note that, if we reserve the order of the conjuncts in
the clean-cleaner sentence, that sentence becomes infelicitous. They account for that fact by using the idea of
granularity shifts, and the idea, which they attribute to Lewis (1979), that only an increase in the granularity of
a measure function is a licensed discourse move (p.151). But note that Lewis (1979) only says that an increase in
the standard of precision is easier than a decrease.
23This point has also been made by Rotstein and Winter (2004, pp.270-273). On their view, maximal standard
gradable adjectives, which they call ‘total adjectives’, are context-dependent.
24Besides accounting for the assertability of the clean-cleaner sentence, they are concerned with accounting
for the infelicity of the result of changing the order between the conjuncts in the clean-cleaner sentence, the
distribution of for-phrases, the semantics of degree modifiers (e.g. completely), and the findings of Syrett
at el. (2009). They also explore the connection between the absolute-relative distinction and the distinction
between stage-level and individual-level predicates. So my discussion here isn’t intended to be a comprehensive
assessment of their account. My main concern here is whether the absolutist can use their account to answer
our challenge in §3.
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modifications to Kennedy’s semantics-pragmatics package (§6–8), it is necessary that we
explore the full potential of their account.
Their account combines two promising but conceptually distinct ideas: The first is to
have the positive forms of gradable adjectives take a comparison-class argument (besides
an individual-argument) and require the individual-argument of a GAmax to be the local
maximum of the comparison-class argument, that is, to have a degree that is at least as
high as every member in the comparison-class argument.25 The second is to allow every
gradable adjective to denote measure functions of different granularities — that is, to
allow every gradable adjective to denote at least two measure functions, such that the
more discriminating functions assign different degrees to objects that are assigned the
same degree by the less discriminating functions.26
Since, as we shall see, each of these ideas has the potential to deliver both coherent-
belief readings of the clean-cleaner belief sentence, and since our primary concern is
whether the absolutist can account for those readings, I will tease those ideas apart and
assess them one by one.
5.1 Local Absolutism
Sassoon and Toledo build their first idea on Bierwisch’s observation about the contrast
between the open-scale adjective ‘tall’ and the adjective ‘industrious’:
(26) All the pupils at this school are tall.
(27) All the pupils at this school are industrious.
(28) Bierwisch’s observation:
In the interpretation of (26) other people must be taken into account, but to inter-
pret (27) they need not be. Put differently, for some people to be tall there must
be short people too, but for some to be industrious there do not need to be any
lazy ones. (Bierwisch 1989, p.89)
Their point of departure is to extend Bierwisch’s observation (about the contrast between
‘tall’ and ‘industrious’) to the contrast between open-scale adjectives and GAmax (in their
positive forms).27 To implement their idea, they propose that open-scale adjectives and
GAmax obligatorily take different kinds of comparison classes as their arguments: When
deciding whether someone is tall, we look for a contextually salient comparison class of
which the person is a member (e.g. people of their age), and ask whether they stand out
against other members in terms of their height; this requirement is intended to capture
the intuition that ‘for some people to be tall there must be short people too’. But when
deciding whether an object is clean, we look for a salient comparison class that comprises
of that object’s counterparts, and ask whether it is at least as clean as each of its counter-
parts; this requirement is intended to capture the intuition that ‘for some people [things]
to be industrious [clean] there do not need to be any lazy [dirty] ones’. Being industrious
(clean), Sassoon and Toledo would say, concerns within-individual comparison, while being
tall concerns between-individual comparison.
Let’s now consider the formal details of their analysis of GAmax. (We’ll set aside
their analysis of open-scale adjectives and GAmin.) They follow Kennedy in assuming
that the meaning of a GAmax is a measure function. But they propose that, when a
GAmax (in its positive form) is predicated of an individual x, that adjective asks for a
contextually salient comparison class whose members are x’s counterparts, and it is true
of x just in case x’s degree on its scale is at least as high as the degree of every member
of x’s comparison class. We can implement this requirement by introducing a new pos-
morpheme that introduces a two-place contextually given comparison-class function that
maps an adjective and an individual to that individual’s counterparts-based comparison
class.28 The following shows how their proposal differs from Kennedy’s:
(29) Kennedy on the positive form of ‘clean’:
25Note that their treatment of the comparison-class argument is different from Kennedy’s (2007): (a) Kennedy
introduces a comparison-class argument to the comparative form rather than to the positive form, and (b) his
comparison-class argument is optional rather than obligatory. See Kennedy (2007; example #26).
26Kennedy and McNally (2005, p.357) have suggested a similar idea.
27It is worth mentioning that, although Sassoon and Toledo’s account of closed-scale adjectives builds on
Bierwisch’s observation about the contrast between ‘tall’ (which Bierwisch calls a ‘dimensional’ adjective) and
‘industrious’ (which Bierwisch calls an ‘evaluative’ adjective), ‘industrious’ doesn’t seem to be a closed-scale
adjective: Both ‘slightly industrious’ and ‘perfectly industrious’ seem to sound bad.
28They proposed three pos-morphemes in total: one for GAmax , one for GAmin (e.g. ‘dirty’), and one for
open-scale adjectives (e.g. ‘tall’).
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a. JposK = λg〈e,d〉. λx. g(x) ≥ s(g), where s is a contextually given function that
maps a gradable adjective g to its contextual threshold s(g).
b. JcleanK = λx. clean(x), where clean(x) is x’s degree of tallness.
c. JposK(JcleanK) = λx.clean(x) ≥ s(JcleanK)
[(a) & (b), Function Application]
(30) Sassoon and Toledo on the positive form of ‘clean’:
a. JposK = λg〈e,d〉. λx. ∀y ∈ c(g, x)[g(x) ≥ g(y)], where c is a contextually given
two-place function that maps the measure function g of a GAmax and an
individual x to a contextually salient set of possible individuals that stand in
the counterpart relation to x.
b. JcleanK = λx. clean(x) [same as Kennedy’s]
c. JposK(JcleanK) = λx. ∀y ∈ c(JcleanK, x)[clean(x) ≥ clean(y)]
[(a) & (b), Function Application]
Here is an example showing how their semantics works: To evaluate whether the sentence
‘Porky is clean’ is true in a context, we ask whether Porky’s degree of cleanness is at least
as high as the degree of cleanness of every member in the contextually salient set of
Porky’s counterparts. If it is, the sentence comes out true. It it isn’t, the sentence comes
out false. We can illustrate their proposal with a diagram like this:
(31) (© ]
The left parenthesis and the right square bracket represent the clean-scale. The circle
in the middle represents the image of the comparison class under the clean measure
function. So to be clean is to be at least as clean as the local maximum of the circle. Call
Sassoon and Toledo’s analysis local absolutism.29
We are now ready to see why local absolutism has the potential to deliver the coherent-
belief readings of the clean-cleaner belief sentence, which I repeat here:
(32) Mary believes that both towels are clean but that the red one is cleaner than the
blue one.
When the towels have different degrees of cleanness, and when their degrees of clean-
ness are higher than the maximas of their comparison classes, we obtain the public-
standard reading. I assume that it is the public-standard reading, rather than the private-
standard reading because the towels’ comparison classes are most plausibly determined
by the contextually salient standard of cleanness (e.g. the speaker’s) rather than by Mary’s
doxastic state.
Local absolutism can also deliver the private-standard reading if we allow the towels’
comparison classes to be determined by Mary’s doxastic state. We can say that the private-
standard reading is true just in case, for every world compatible with Mary’s beliefs, the
red towel’s (the blue towel’s) comparison class in that world is such that none of its
members is cleaner than the red towel (the blue towel). We can distinguish these truth
conditions from the truth conditions of the public-standard reading by using the tools I
discuss in §7-8. But we will suppress the details here and focus on a problem with local
absolutism.
While local absolutism can deliver both coherent-belief readings of the clean-cleaner
belief sentence, it is not a fully satisfactory response to our challenge to the absolutist
because its motivating idea that the truth conditions of GAmax (in their positive forms)
always depend on comparisons between their actual arguments and those arguments’
counterparts is not entirely unproblematic. To see this, suppose this is how we understand
‘clean’ in our conversation: We decide that how clean an object is depends solely on the
quantities of germs it has per square centimeter. Let’s say Porky the pig is less clean than
Tom the towel by this standard. This means that Tom ought to count as clean whenever
Porky does — this is what Kennedy’s account would predict if we dropped the economy
principle and allowed the contextual threshold of ‘clean’ to vary across contexts. But
29Their proposal is intended to be compatible with the economy principle. They suggest that the principle
is responsible for the locally maximal truth conditions of GAmax (Toledo and Sassoon 2011, p.144). But we
should notice that their economy principle is different from Kennedy’s, in two ways: First, while Kennedy’s
requires the contextual threshold for ‘clean’ to always coincide with the maximal endpoint of the clean-scale
(§2), theirs only requires that contextual threshold to coincide with a locally maximal degree of the clean-scale.
Second, while Kennedy’s forces the contextual function to be chosen in such a way that the resulting threshold
for ‘clean’ coincides with the maximal endpoint of the clean-scale, theirs puts no restrictions on how the two-
place comparison class function (introduced by their pos) should be chosen — because, on their account, the
relevant comparison class can be anywhere along the clean-scale — and the locally maximal truth conditions
are essentially encoded by the meaning of their pos rather than dictated by the economy principle as they argue
they are (see (30-a)).
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according to local absolutism, that may not be true: If Porky has been so well taken
care of that he is as clean as he could possibly be, but Tom hasn’t yet been boiled and
disinfected and could have been cleaner, Porky can be clean without Tom being clean.
The following diagrams illustrate this counter-intuitive result:
(33) ( p t ]
(34) (©p t© ]
The first circle and the second circle in (34) represent the contextually salient compar-
ison classes for Porky and Tom. Since Porky is at least as clean as every member in his
comparison class, he is clean. But since Tom is less clean than some member in his com-
parison class, he is not clean, even though he is cleaner than Porky. (The counter-intuitive
feel of this result gets stronger if we replace Porky in our example by an object that is in
its nature to be dirty.)
One may argue that this counter-intuitive consequence can never happen because,
since the counterparts Porky has in the presence of Tom are much cleaner than the coun-
terparts he has in the absence of Tom,30 the first circle should extend a lot farther to the
right than my diagram suggests. But this reply doesn’t seem to work because it is possible
that Porky’s counterparts, represented by the first circle on the diagram, are already on
average cleaner than they would have been had Tom been absent. That is, in the absence
of Tom, Porky’s counterparts should be represented by an oblong that extends a lot more
to the left than the first circle in (34).
Call this problem the Porky-Tom problem (or the problem of cross-sortal comparison).
While I agree with Sassoon and Toledo that their counterpart-based reading of GAmax
exists, GAmax (in their positive forms) do have a reading on which their truth conditions
depend solely on comparisons between actual individuals. For example, just as we can
classify objects into the clean ones and the not clean ones based on their actual germ
counts alone, we can classify running and cycling routes into the flat ones and the not flat
ones based on their actual elevation gains alone — 10 feet is flat but 10,000 feet isn’t. It
seems that by making the comparison-class argument both obligatory and counterpart-
based, Sassoon and Toledo’s proposal makes it very difficult to account for that reading.31
5.2 Granularity Shift
We turn now to Sassoon and Toledo’s idea that each gradable adjective can be associated
with measure functions of different granularities. This idea is supported by various ev-
eryday examples: Due to the limits of our perceptual power, we normally treat glasses of
water which look indistinguishable to us as equally full, even though, with appropriate
measurement tools and enough time, we are able to make finer distinctions among the
same glasses. Also, we often count containers that are filled up to certain conventionally
recognized levels as full for practical purposes. For example, a bowl that is filled with rice
30Toledo and Sassoon (2011) propose that the comparison class is determined primarily by the object of which
the adjective is predicated, but that it can be affected by other salient actual objects:
(i) a. ’Both types of comparison classes [i.e. those of relative adjectives and absolute adjectives] are
subject to contextual considerations. The classes are determined first and foremost based on the individual
of which the adjective is predicated while at the same time context sensitivity comes into play through
the individuals comprising the comparison class.’ (p.142, emphasis mine)
b. ‘Other cups in the extensional context which are full to an unusual degree may affect the compar-
ison class by increasing the salience of counterparts of the actual cup which are full to unusual
degrees.’ (p.143)
The crucial issue here is how exactly the object of which a GAmax is predicated and other salient actual objects
jointly determine the object’s comparison class. We can’t fully solve the Porky-Tom problem without knowing
how exactly the presence of Tom affects Porky’s comparison class.
31Kennedy’s account of the comparison-class argument — which makes that argument optional rather than
obligatory — can account for both the counterpart-based reading of ‘clean’ and the non-counterpart-based read-
ing. If we are interested in whether Porky/ Tom stands out against his counterparts in terms of his cleanness, we
can use the following typeshifting principle to create a comparison class argument slot in ‘clean’, and saturate it
with Porky’s/ Tom’s set of counterparts:
(i) For any gradable adjective with meaning JAK, it can be typeshifted into the following meaning:
JA′K = λ f〈e,t〉[λx[ f (x).JAK(x)]] (Kennedy 2007, p.16)
Since the clean-function restricted to the set of Porky’s counterparts is distinct from the clean-function restricted
to the set of Tom’s counterparts, it is possible that the first clean-function’s contextual threshold is lower than
the second clean-function’s.
Suppose we are interested in whether Porky/ Tom is clean by the germ-count standard. We do not need to
use the typeshifting rule (i). We simply have Porky/ Tom combine with pos clean so that we obtain TRUE if
Porky’s/ Tom’s actual degree of cleanness is at least as high as the contextual threshold for ‘clean’ and FALSE
otherwise.
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roughly up to its rim is already full. A bowl with even more rice is usually considered full
just the same. Sassoon and Toledo (2011) helpfully describe cases like these as exhibiting
a ‘ceiling effect’.
As before, we are primarily interested in whether their idea answers our challenge to
the absolutist. Consider our belief sentence:
(35) Mary believes that both towels are clean but that the red one is cleaner than the
blue one.
Their idea — call it granularity shift — looks initially promising. We can obtain a coherent-
belief reading when the first instance of ‘clean’ denotes a measure function whose granu-
larity is lower than that of the clean-function denoted by the second instance; the idea is
that since the two instances of ‘clean’ denote two distinct measure functions, it is consis-
tent that the second measure function maps the towels to two different degrees while the
towels are mapped to the same (maximal) degree by the first measure function. Perhaps
we can also distinguish between the public-standard reading and the private-standard
reading by distinguishing between the contextually salient granularities and the pairs of
granularities compatible with Mary’s beliefs (but how this idea can be implemented is
beyond my expertise).
While initially promising, granularity shift predicts that the following contradiction is
consistent:
(36) #Both towels are clean, but the red one is cleaner than the blue one and so the blue
one is not clean.
The reason is that since the granularity of the clean-function can increase as we go from
the first conjunct to the second conjunct, the third instance of ‘clean’ can denote a different
function from the first instance. This means that ‘both towels are clean’ and ‘the blue one
is not clean’ can be true at the same time. So granularity shift seems to deprive us of the
most straightforward explanation for the unacceptability of (36): It is a contradiction.32
The worry here isn’t just about individual sentences such as (36). It is the more general
one that we are not entitled to granularity shifts unless we have an account of when those
shifts are triggered and when they are prohibited. Without such an account, we are unable
to explain why while ‘Porky is clean and not clean’ ought to be contradictory,33 Rotstein
and Winter’s clean-cleaner sentence isn’t. So granularity shift alone can’t answer our
challenge to the absolutist.
We have now evaluated both a pragmatic and a semantic response to our challenge to
the absolutist. In the next three sections, we develop a relativist-friendly modification to
Kennedy’s account of gradable adjectives. The next section discusses how the contextual
thresholds for GAmax are determined (if not by the economy principle). §7-8 provide two
plausible analyses of the private-public ambiguity.
6 The Limit of Pragmatic Slack
In §2, we traced the absolutist commitment of Kennedy’s account to the economy prin-
ciple. Recall the benefits of having that principle as part of Kennedy’s account: The
principle prevents GAmax from having an overly weak truth-condition (e.g. the possibility
that a half-full bus counts as full) and explains Syrett et al.’s (2009) findings about grad-
able adjectives in definite descriptions. But we discussed that Syrett et al.’s findings are
compatible with the hypothesis that the contextual thresholds of GAmax do shift but do
so in a more restricted way than those of open-scale adjectives. This section attempts to
develop that hypothesis further and explain, without resorting to the economy principle,
why GAmax do not have an overly weak truth-condition.
The main idea we need is already a part of Lasersohn’s theory: We speak loosely, but
we can only speak a little bit loosely.34 But our point of departure is that we can speak
loosely without asserting a falsehood or a contradiction.35
32It won’t do to say that the granularity of the third clean-function decreases to a level that matches the
first clean-function’s because Toledo and Sassoon (2011) hold that only an increase in granularity is a licensed
discourse move (p.151).
33But see Burnett (2014) which allows some contradictions to be true.
34Lasersohn (1999) says explicitly that the amount of pragmatic slack allowed in a context has to be small:
‘When extreme precision is not required, people accept utterances that deviate in minor ways from the truth’
(p.525). I think that it is worth exploring why the amount of pragmatic slack has to be small.
35For discussions that analyze loose sentences as expressing literal truths, see Lewis (1979), Krifka (2007), and
Sauerland and Stateva (2011).
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Let me elaborate. Consider Kennedy’s account without the economy principle. The
possible interpretations of the positive form of a GAmax range from the strictest and the
most informative36 endpoint-oriented interpretation to the very loose and very uninfor-
mative interpretations on which almost every object counts as having the property ex-
pressed by that adjective. The strictest interpretation is most preferred based on the con-
sideration of informativity maximalization alone.37 But since that interpretation is false of
every ordinary object,38 and since we ought to speak truly (by Quality), there is a pressure
to speak loosely by adopting a lower threshold so that we can speak both truly and in-
formatively. Of course, when speaking loosely, we ought not speak too loosely because if
the contextual threshold is too low, we lose informativity without any gain in Quality. So
there is a limit to how loosely we can speak; I propose that it is that limit, rather than the
economy principle, that constrains how the contextual thresholds for GAmax are chosen.
Given a GAmax uttered in a certain context, we are going to represent the maximal
amount of pragmatic slack that can be tolerated for that adjective in that context by a
threshold degree on that adjective’s scale. The idea is that the more slack is tolerated, the
farther away that degree is from the maximal endpoint of that adjective’s scale. Call that
degree the limit of pragmatic slack (l).
Let me state how our proposal differs from the economy truth conditions (9). The
threshold for a GAmax relative to a context is now that adjective’s limit of pragmatic
slack rather than the maximal endpoint of that adjective’s scale. The same is true for
GAmin/max (e.g. ‘transparent’) when the near-maximal-endpoint or the maximal-endpoint
interpretation is intended. The case for GAmin (e.g. ‘dirty’) and for the near-minimal-
endpoint interpretation of GAmin/max is slightly more complicated. To illustrate, let’s
focus on ‘dirty’. Since the economy principle is not a part of our proposal, the adjective’s
contextual threshold no longer always coincides with the least non-zero degree of the
dirty-scale. This means that the dirty-threshold may coincide with the minimal endpoint
of the dirty-scale (i.e. the degree representing the complete absence of dirt). Clearly, we
need to block that possibility because an object having a zero degree of dirtiness is never
dirty. So we have no choice but to introduce a new pos-morpheme, pos>, which uses the
strictly-greater-than (>) relation instead of the greater-than-or-equal-to relation (≥):
(37) a. Kennedy’s pos:
Jpos≥K = λg〈e,d〉. λx. g(x) ≥ s(g)
b. The new pos:
Jpos>K = λg〈e,d〉. λx. g(x) > s(g)
To avoid unwanted truth-conditions, we will also (i) require ‘dirty’ and other GAmin to
combine with the new pos-morpheme (i.e. pos>) instead of Kennedy’s (i.e. pos≥); (ii) re-
quire GAmax (e.g. ‘clean’) to combine with pos≥ instead of pos>; and (iii) allow GAmin/max
(e.g. ‘transparent’) to combine with either pos> (when the near-minimal-endpoint reading
is intended) or pos≥ (when the maximal-endpoint or near-maximal-endpoint reading is
intended).39
The following summarizes our proposed modifications:
(38) a. Partially-closed scales with maximal endpoints ( ]
(e.g. flat, clean, dry, certain):
pos(g)(x) = 1 iff g(x) ≥ s(g) ≥ lg,
where s(g) is the contextual threshold, and lg is the limit of pragmatic slack
for g.
(Note: the value of lg may vary from context to context)
b. Partially-closed scales with minimal endpoints [ )
36I define the informativeness of a given interpretation of the positive form of a GAmax in terms of set mem-
bership (or entailment). For any GAmax , for any contextual thresholds t1 and t2, if the positive-form denotation
of GAmax based on t1 is a subset of that based on t2, then the denotation based on t1 is more informative than
that based on t2.
37It is also possible that it is most preferred because it is mutually salient to the interlocutors (Potts 2008).
38That interpretation is typically not relevant to the goals of our conversation as well. Relevance is likely to
affect how the contextual thresholds for GAmax are chosen. But, for simplicity, I focus on the tradeoff between
Quality and informativity maximalization.
39A somewhat radical way to avoid these admittedly inelegant stipulations and save the hypothesis that there
is only a single pos-morpheme is to strike out the degree on the dirty-scale that represents the complete absence
of dirt, making the dirty-scale open at both ends (see Rotstein and Winter (2004) for a similar proposal). On
this proposal, perfectly clean objects, together with objects to which the concept of dirtiness does not apply (e.g.
the number 2), are not mapped to any degree on the dirty scale. But this proposal has two drawbacks. First,
it cannot account for the intuitive difference between a perfectly clean object being not dirty and the number 2
being not dirty. While the former is perfectly natural, the latter seems to involve a category mistake. Second,
by holding that the dirty-scale is open just like the tall-scale, it can’t explain the contrast between ‘slightly dirty’
and ‘#slightly tall’ in terms of the difference in structure between the dirty-scale and the tall-scale.
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(e.g. bumpy, dirty, wet, uncertain):
pos(g)(x) = 1 iff g(x) ≥ s(g) > min(g),
where min(g) is the minimal endpoint of the scale of g.40
c. Totally-closed scales [ ]
(e.g. transparent, opaque):
pos(g)(x) = 1 iff g(x) ≥ s(g) ≥ l or g(x) ≥ s(g) > min(g)41
One may object that my proposal assigns an overly strong truth condition to adjectives
whose scales have minimal endpoints (e.g. ‘dirty’, ‘transparent’) because their contextual
thresholds can now be any degree higher than their scales’ minimal endpoints, rather than
just their scales’ least non-zero degrees. They may support their objection with Kennedy
and McNally’s observation that the following sentences are unacceptable:
(39) a. #My hands are not wet, but there is some water on them. (Kennedy and
McNally 2005, 36a)
b. #The door isn’t open, but it is ajar. (Kennedy and McNally 2005, 36b)
They may argue that if the contextual threshold of ‘wet’ can be anywhere along its scale
just as I claim, then it ought to be possible that the hands are not wet enough to count
as wet despite their having non-zero degrees of wetness, which is contrary to what (39-a)
seems to suggest. They can easily run a similar objection based on (39-b).
But we should note some similarity between these examples and an entailment claim
we discussed in §2, which I repeat here:
(40) The table is not wet  The table is dry. (Kennedy 2007, 47b)
I argued that this entailment doesn’t always hold because there are examples where an
object is not wet without having a zero degree of wetness (e.g. moist towels). So the
badness of (39-a) may not be due to the fact that the truth of ‘my hands are not wet’ is
always incompatible with my hands having a non-zero degree of wetness. (My hands do
currently have some moisture on them but they are certainly not wet.) It may be due to
the fact that the second conjunct, together with ‘but’, conveys that the hands’ degrees of
wetness are already higher than the relevant (non-minimal) contextual threshold for ‘wet’.
A similar explanation may apply to the badness of (39-b).
A consideration in favor of my proposal is that adjectives such as ‘dirty’ and ‘trans-
parent’ (and negated GAmax such as ‘not clean’) can now receive a more informative
interpretation than they do on Kennedy’s account. When we say that coal is dirty (not
clean),42 we typically don’t mean that it is not maximally clean, which is certainly true
but highly uninformative. Rather, we mean that its degree of dirtiness (cleanness) is above
(lower than) a salient non-minimal (non-maximal) standard, such as the average degree
of dirtiness (cleanness) of the available sources of energy. My proposal delivers this more
informative interpretation for free because the contextual threshold can be higher than
the dirty-scale’s least non-zero degree (lower than the clean-scale’s maximal endpoint).43
Before we leave this section, let’s reiterate how our account of the contextual thresh-
olds of GAmax differs from Kennedy’s and make explicit its key consequence. On our
account, the reason why GAmax do not have an overly weak truth condition (e.g. a half-
full bus can never count as full) is not because of the economy principle but because of the
tradeoff between informativity maximalization and Quality. Since the contextual thresh-
olds of GAmax need not be maximal, we do not analyze the clean-cleaner sentence as a
contradiction. This means that we can use one of the semantic analyses below to account
for the public-private ambiguity of the clean-cleaner belief sentence.
40For simplicity, we assume that the thresholds of these adjectives are unrelated to those of their antonyms.
41The second disjunct here allows the possibility that g(x) = max(g) ≥ s(g) > min(g). This doesn’t seem to
be problematic because we can imagine that a minimally transparent glass gradually becomes more transparent,
and eventually becomes maximally transparent. So I am not going to block this possibility by introducing a
pos-morpheme dedicated to adjectives with totally-closed scales.
42Carter (2017) helpfully points that when numerical expressions (e.g. 14 million) are embedded in negation
contexts (e.g. I don’t have 14 million books), an increase in their imprecision results in a stronger (i.e. more
informative) proposition, and that Lasersohn’s theory, which only targets imprecision phenomena where the im-
precise content is weaker than the precise content, cannot be easily extended to account for such strengthening.
His insight applies to GAmax in negation contexts as well.
43My proposal on ‘dirty’ is more similar to Rotstein and Winter’s (2004) than it is to Kennedy’s. According
to Rotstein and Winter, like maximal standard gradable adjectives, minimal standard gradable adjectives, which
they call ‘partial adjectives’, are context-dependent. For example, the denotation of ‘dirty’ in its positive form is
a set of points on its scale that represent levels of dirtiness that are higher than that represented by its context-
dependent standard value, which can be anywhere along its scale.
16
7 World Variables and Binding Ambiguities
7.1 The basic idea
The basic idea of the analysis: We posit a world argument not only in every predicate
but also in the pos-morpheme (pos≥). The public-private ambiguity will be analyzed as
arising from the binding possibilities of the world-variables in the first conjunct of the
embedded clean-cleaner sentence.44 Since nothing interesting occurs in the second con-
junct of the embedded clean-cleaner sentence, we’ll focus on the simpler belief sentence
SPorky below. We’ll derive its public-standard reading by having the world-variable at
the pos-morpheme bound ‘long distance’ by a variable binder at its top, and deliver its
private-standard reading by having the world-variable at the pos-morpheme bound lo-
cally by a variable binder on top of ‘Porky is clean’:
(41) Public-standard reading:
a. LF1: λw0 Mary believesw0 [λw1 Porky posw0 cleanw1 ]
b. JLF1Kc,g = λw0. believes(w0 , λu. clean(p)(u) ≥ scclean(w0),m)
(42) Private-standard reading:
a. LF2: λw0 Mary believesw0 [λw1 Porky posw1 cleanw1 ]
b. JLF2Kc,g = λw0. believes(w0 , λu. clean(p)(u) ≥ scclean(u),m)
So analyzed, the public-standard reading of SPorky is true at the world w of a context
just in case, for every world compatible with the beliefs of Mary at w, Porky’s degree
of cleanness at that world is at least as high as the (potentially non-maximal) threshold
degree for ‘clean’ at w; the private-standard reading of SPorky is true at the world w of
a context just in case, for every world compatible with the beliefs of Mary at w, Porky’s
degree of cleanness at that world is at least as high as the (potentially non-maximal)
threshold degree for ‘clean’ at that world.
Below, we’ll first make explicit the lexical entries and the composition rules needed for
this analysis; after that, we’ll discuss two potential costs of this analysis.
7.2 Lexical entries and composition rules





tall ,...〉,g = λw. λG〈e,d〉. λx. G(x) ≥ scG(w)
A remark on the threshold function scG is in order. Unlike the threshold function on
Kennedy’s account (see (8-b)), which maps an adjectival meaning to a threshold degree,
ours maps a world to a threshold degree. To allow for the possibility that different ad-
jectives have different threshold degrees in the same context, we represent a context as a
sequence of threshold functions each of which is dedicated to a single gradable adjective.45
Having made clear how we represent a context, from now on, we notate the meaning
of the pos-morpheme in the more reader-friendly way below:
(44) Jpos≥Kc,g = λw. λG〈e,d〉. λx. G(x) ≥ scG(w)
The meaning of ‘clean’ is as follows (which shouldn’t be surprising):
(45) JcleanKc,g = λw. λx. clean(x)(w) = λw. λx. x’s degree of cleanness in w
The idea here is simply that an object can have different degrees of cleanness in different
worlds — or alternatively, that the clean measure function can vary from world to world.
The meanings of ‘Mary’ and ‘Porky’ are Mary (m) and Porky (p). And the meaning of
‘believe’ is the one stated in (24); I restate here for the reader’s convenience:
(46) JbelieveKc,g = λw. λp〈s,t〉. λx. ∀w′[w′R(x)(w)→ p(w′) = 1],
where ‘w′R(x)(w)’ reads: w′ is a (logically) possible world compatible with the
beliefs x has at world w.
44As an anonymous reviewer points out, such binding ambiguities are standard fare in semantics and have
been exploited in the analyses of Russell’s Ambiguity (e.g. ‘I thought your yacht was larger than it is’ (Russell
1905)), and of the ambiguities of determiner phrases (DPs) in modal contexts (Heim 2000; Percus 2000; von
Fintel and Heim 2011, Ch. 8). I wish to thank the reviewer for suggesting to me the analysis considered here
and its connection with previous work.
45Here we complicate the context-representation so as to simplify the threshold function. This move is inspired
by Lassiter and Goodman (2017, example 24).
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So much for the lexical entries. The only compositional rules we need are Function Ap-
plication and Lambda Abstraction; the latter is stated below:
(47) Lambda Abstraction:
JλwiαKc,g = λu ∈W.JαKc,g[wi→u],
where W is the set of worlds and g[wi → u] is just like g expect that it maps wi to
u.
By using these lexical entries and composition rules, we can compute the truth-conditions
of LF1 in the following way (The computations for LF2 are similar. The reader can skip
ahead without much loss):
(48) a. Jpos≥ w0Kc,g = λG. λx. G(x) ≥ scG(g(w0))
[pos & variable, Function Application]
b. Jclean w1Kc,g = λx. clean(x)(g(w1))
[clean & variable, Function Application]
c. Jbelieve w0Kc,g
= λp〈s,t〉. λx. ∀w′[w′R(x)(g(w0))→ p(w′) = 1]
[believe & variable, Function Application]
= λp〈s,t〉. λx. ∀w′R(x)(g(w0))[p(w′) = 1]
[notation simplified for readability]
d. Jpos≥ w0 clean w1Kc,g = λx. clean(x)(g(w1)) ≥ scclean(g(w0))
[(a) & (b), Function Application]
e. JPorky pos w0 clean w1Kc,g = clean(p)(g(w1)) ≥ scclean(g(w0))
[(d) & Porky, Function Application]
f. Jλw1 Porky pos w0 clean w1Kc,g
= λu ∈W. clean(p)(u) ≥ scclean(g(w0))
[Lambda Abstraction on (e)]
g. Jbelieve w0 λw1 Porky pos w0 clean w1Kc,g
= λx. ∀w′R(x)(g(w0))[clean(p)(w′) ≥ scclean(g(w0))]
[(c) & (f), Function Application]
h. JMary believe w0 λw1 Porky pos w0 clean w1Kc,g
= ∀w′R(m)(g(w0))[clean(p)(w′) ≥ scclean(g(w0))]
[(g) & Mary, Function Application]
i. Jλw0 Mary believe w0 λw1 Porky pos w0 clean w1Kc,g
= λu ∈W. ∀w′R(m)(u)[clean(p)(w′) ≥ scclean(u)]
[Lambda Abstraction on (h)]
7.3 Two potential costs
We turn now to two issues with this analysis that I can’t resolve in this paper. The first
is an overgeneration worry: While LF1 and LF2 deliver respectively the public-standing
reading and the private-standard reading of SPorky, the following LFs deliver for that
sentence truth-conditions that are intuitively incorrect.
(49) a. LF3: λw0 Mary believesw0 [λw1 Porky posw0 cleanw0 ]
b. JLF3Kc,g = λw0. believes(w0 , λu. clean(p)(w0) ≥ scclean(w0),m)
(50) a. LF4: λw0 Mary believesw0 [λw1 Porky posw1 cleanw0 ]
b. JLF4Kc,g = λw0. believes(w0 , λu. clean(p)(w0) ≥ scclean(u),m)
LF3 and LF4 result in very strange belief attributions. LF3 attributes to Mary a belief
whose content is either true in every world (if Porky’s degree of cleanness in the world
of the context is at least as high as the clean-threshold in that world, i.e. Porky is clean)
or false in every world (if Porky is not clean). LF4 is true at the world of a context, w@,
just in case for every world wm compatible with Mary’s beliefs at w@, Porky’s degree of
cleanness in w@ is at least as high as the clean-threshold at wm. This means that it predicts
SPorky to be true when Porky’s degree of cleanness in the actual world is maximal but
his degree of cleanness at each of Mary’s belief world is below the clean-threshold at that
same world. But if that scenario obtains, we should judge SPorky to be false.
So, for this analysis to be fully satisfactory, we need an independently motivated prin-
ciple or a binding theory that blocks LF3 and LF4 while retaining LF1 and LF2. But I am
not able to supply such principle or theory here.
The second issue is the analogue of our objection to the absolutist’s attempt to use
Lasersohn’s theory of pragmatic halos to account for the private-standard reading of the
clean-cleaner sentence. Recall that our objection is essentially that if we don’t know what
Mary’s standard of cleanness is, we can’t make sure that the halo is of the right size to
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represent Mary’s standard of cleanness, which means that we can’t rationally intend to
speak both truthfully and informatively by uttering the belief sentence. But our analysis
of the private-standard reading (repeated below) runs into a similar sort of problem.
(51) Private-standard reading:
a. LF2: λw0 Mary believesw0 [λw1 Porky posw1 cleanw1 ]
b. JLF2Kc,g = λw0. believes(w0 , λu. clean(p)(u) ≥ scclean(u),m)
Notice that, like the pragmatic halo for ‘clean’, the threshold function scclean is given by
the context, and it can vary from context to context depending on how much slack the
interlocutors give to the meaning of ‘clean’. Assume, for simplicity, that Mary has in mind
a single standard of cleanness and that it corresponds to the degree d? on the clean-scale.
If we don’t know what Mary’s standard is, it seems we are in no position to know that
scclean maps every world compatible with Mary’s belief to a degree that is equal to or lower
than d? so that we speak truly, but not so low that we speak unduly uninformatively.
The analysis we discuss in the next section addresses the issue we just discussed by
requiring the clean-threshold(s) be either fixed entirely by Mary’s doxastic state (when the
private-standard reading is intended) or fixed entirely by the context (when the public-
standard reading is intended). As we shall see, that analysis avoids unwanted truth-
conditions as well.
8 The Character of the Positive Form
8.1 The basic idea
The basic idea behind the analysis considered here is to liken the threshold function for a
gradable adjective to the value of a shiftable indexical, which can shift under some modal
contexts (Schlenker 2003; Anand 2006): When the threshold function is not shifted, it is
fixed by the context alone, and we get the public-standard reading. When it is, it is fixed
by the doxastic state of the belief subject alone, and we get the private-standard reading.
To begin, let’s review the tool of double-indexing (Kaplan 1989). Consider the sentence
‘I am Ann’ uttered by Ann and Bob:
(52) a. Ann: I am Ann.
b. Bob: I am Ann.
Following Kaplan, we assume that the sentence has two kinds of meaning: the meaning
of the sentence’s type (i.e. character), and the meanings of its tokens uttered by different
speakers (i.e. contents). The meaning of the sentence’s type is the same regardless of who
uses it. But the meaning of Ann’s token is different from that of Bob’s because Ann’s is
true just in case Ann is Ann, and Bob’s is true just in case Bob is Ann.
Also following Kaplan, we assume that a sentence’s character determines its possible
contents. To make this determination relation precise, let’s introduce two kinds of abstract
objects: formal contexts and circumstances of evaluation. Formal contexts are representations
of the physical circumstances in which a sentence is uttered. And circumstances of eval-
uation are representations of the actual or possible situations in which a proposition is
evaluated for its truth value. For simplicity, I assume that the relations between formal
contexts and contexts and between circumstances of evaluation and situations are one-to-
one,46 and that both formal contexts and circumstances of evaluation are individual-world
pairs, such as 〈Ann, the actual world〉 and 〈Bob, world XYZ〉,4748 where the individual
(world) is the speaker (world) of a context or a situation.
46This assumption isn’t essential to my account. We should also note that some authors don’t endorse a
one-to-one correspondence between formal contexts and contexts of utterance. For example, Lasersohn (2005)
proposes that each formal context has a judge coordinate, and that sentences are evaluated for their truth values
at world-time-judge triples. But he makes it explicit that there need not be a one-to-one correspondence between
formal contexts and contexts of utterance (pp.668-669) because such correspondence entails that there is a fact
of the matter as to who the judge at a certain context of utterance is, and therefore that there is a fact of the
matter as to whether ‘Licorice is tasty’ is true at a certain context of utterance, which defeats the motivation for
his relativist semantics. I borrow the term ‘formal context’ from his discussion.
47Here I depart from Kaplan’s (1989) version of double-indexing; for him, formal contexts are agent-time-
position-world 4-tuples, and circumstances of evaluation are world-time pairs. But see Zimmermann (2013) and
Anand (2006) who assume that formal contexts are structurally identical to circumstances of evaluation.
48I set aside the issue whether every formal context has to be proper in Kaplan’s (1989, p.509, p.544) sense: For
every formal context c, the agent of c exists and is located at the position of c in the world of c at the time of
c. For simplicity, I allow improper formal contexts. See Predelli (1998a, 1998b) for relevant discussions on this
issue.
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With formal contexts and circumstances of evaluation in place, we are now ready to
say how the character of ‘I am Ann’ determines its contents. Ann’s context is represented
by the formal context 〈Ann, Ann’s world〉. The individual in that formal context (i.e.
Ann) fixes the content of ‘I’ so that ‘I am Ann’, in Ann’s context, expresses a content that
is true just in case Ann is Ann. We’ll identify this content with the set of circumstances
of evaluation in which Ann is Ann (i.e. the entire set of circumstances of evaluation).
Similarly, ‘I am Ann’, in Bob’s context, expresses a content that’s identical to the set of
circumstances of evaluation in which Bob is Ann (i.e. the empty set). We’ll define the
character of ‘I am Ann’ to be the function that maps the formal context 〈Ann, Ann’s
world〉 (〈Bob, Bob’s world〉) to the set of circumstances of evaluation in which Ann is
Ann (the set of circumstances of evaluation in which Bob is Ann). So the character of ‘I
am Ann’ determines its contents in the precise sense that its contents are the members of
its codomain.
The following is a finite snapshot of the character of ‘I am Ann’:
(53)
i1 i2
c1 a=a (TRUE) a=a (TRUE)
c2 b=a (FALSE) b=a (FALSE)
c1 and c2 are the formal contexts representing Ann’s context and Bob’s respectively. i1 and
i2 are copies of c1 and c2, but they play the role of representing the situations at which a
proposition is evaluated for its truth value. The row at c1 — or, more precisely, the set of
circumstances of evaluation at which Ann is Ann (i.e. a=a) — is the content of Ann’s ut-
terance of ‘I am Ann’. Likewise for the row at c2. We’ll refer to these contents as horizontal
propositions. The proposition going from the top left-hand corner to the bottom right-hand
corner is called the diagonal proposition; it has the nice property that its truth value at a
circumstance of evaluation depends on that circumstance’s individual coordinate (notice
that it is true at i1 but false at i2). The concepts of horizontal proposition and of diag-
onal proposition will come in handy when we distinguish between the public-standard
reading and the private-standard reading.
I now motivate a modest extension of the double-indexing framework. Consider:
(54) a. Pet owner: Porky is clean.
b. Butcher: Porky is clean.
Since the pos-morpheme preceding ‘clean’ introduces a threshold function, and since,
with the substitution of the limit of pragmatic slack for the economy principle, the clean-
threshold can be anywhere between the limit value l and the maximal endpoint of the
clean-scale, the proposition expressed by the pet owner’s utterance of ‘Porky is clean’
can be based on a higher contextual threshold than the proposition expressed by the
butcher’s utterance of the same sentence. We can think of these propositions as two




c1(Pet owner) clean(c1)(i1)(p) ≥ 0.9 clean(c1)(i2)(p) ≥ 0.9
c2(Butcher) clean(c2)(i1)(p) ≥ 0.7 clean(c2)(i2)(p) ≥ 0.7
Here I assume that ‘clean’ has a constant character, that is, its intension does not vary
from context to context.49 The intension of ‘clean’ is always the function that maps a
circumstance of evaluation and an object to that object’s degree of cleanness at (the world
of) that circumstance. So the context-dependence of the positive form of ‘clean’ is due
solely to the threshold function introduced by the pos-morpheme.
We now extend each formal context and each circumstance of evaluation with a pos-
sible threshold function that maps the character of a gradable adjective to a threshold
degree. (Notice that, unlike the threshold function we used in the previous analysis,
which asks for a possible world, the threshold function we use here asks for an adjectival
character.) For example, the threshold function at formal context c1 just is that context’s
threshold function coordinate, and it maps the character of ‘clean’ to the clean-threshold
at c1 (i.e. 0.9). (Note that the numerical values are merely illustrative. I do not identify
the degrees on adjectival scales with numbers.)
Since the speaker coordinates in the formal contexts and the circumstances of evalua-
tion will raise a (solvable) technical issue that is irrelevant to the main idea of my proposal,
let’s assume temporarily that both formal contexts and circumstances of evaluation are
function-world pairs, rather than function-individual-world triples. (We’ll discuss how
49I am going to ignore complications such as granularity shifts (§5.2).
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we can put the speaker coordinate back into the formal contexts and the circumstances of
evaluation in §8.2.)
The main motivation for this extension of the double-indexing framework is that we
can now derive the public-standard reading and the private-standard reading of the clean-
cleaner belief sentence from the horizontal and the diagonal propositions of the character
of the embedded clean-cleaner sentence.
To see how we can account for the public-private ambiguity, we consider SPorky (i.e.
‘Mary believes that Porky is clean’) uttered in the pet owner’s context (i.e. c1). We can
obtain its public-standard reading by having ‘believe’ take as inputs Mary and the hori-
zontal proposition of ‘Porky is clean’ at the pet owner’s context. The resulting proposition
is true at a circumstance of evaluation i just in case Porky’s degree of cleanness at every
circumstance of evaluation i′ compatible with Mary’s beliefs at i is at least as high as 0.9.
We can obtain the private-standard reading of SPorky by having ‘believe’ take as inputs
Mary and the diagonal proposition of ‘Porky is clean’. The resulting proposition is true
at a circumstance of evaluation i just in case, for every circumstance of evaluation i′ com-
patible with Mary’s beliefs at i, Porky’s degree of cleanness at i′ is at least as high as the
threshold value determined by i′.
In the rest of this section, we make explicit the lexical entries and the compositional
rules before we compare this analysis with the previous one.
8.2 Lexical entries and composition rules
Our goal in this subsection is to introduce the lexical entries and the compositional rules
we need for this analysis. Along the way, we discuss how we can drop our assumption that
the speaker is not a coordinate of the formal contexts and the circumstances of evaluation.
Some helpful notations: We’ll notate the threshold function coordinate of a formal con-
text c as s(c). Similarly, we’ll notate the threshold function coordinate of a circumstance
of evaluation i as s(i).
The following is the lexical entries we need:
(56) Lexical entries:
a. Jpos≥Kc,i = λg〈ci,ed〉. λx. g(c)(i)(x) ≥ s(c)(g),
where s(c) is the threshold function of c, and s(c)(g) is a degree on the scale
of g that is as least as high as the limit of pragmatic slack for g at c.
b. JcleanKc,i
= λx. clean(c)(i)(x)
= x’s degree of cleanness at circumstance of evaluation i.
(Note: ‘clean’ has a constant character)
c. JbelieveKc,i = λp〈i,t〉. λx. ∀i′[i′R(x)(i) → p(i′) = 1], where ‘i′R(x)(i)’ reads:
circumstance of evaluation i′ is compatible with the beliefs of individual x at
circumstance of evaluation i.
d. JMaryKc,i = m (Likewise for ‘Porky’)
A brief comment about these meanings is in order: pos≥ is the only meaning that has a
non-constant character; it has a non-constant character because it provides an adjective
with different thresholds in different contexts. The content of ‘believe’ is just like believe
stated in (24), except that the worlds compatible with a subject’s beliefs are now centered
worlds which contain (at least) a world and a threshold function.
Our system has two composition rules. The first is a type-sensitive function application
rule:
(57) Type-sensitive Function Application (F.A.)
a. Extension F.A.:
If α is of type 〈c, 〈i, 〈θ, γ〉〉〉 and β is of type 〈c, 〈i, θ〉〉,
then JαβKc,i = JαKc,i(JβKc,i)
b. Intension F.A.:
If α is of type 〈c, 〈i, 〈iθ, γ〉〉〉 and β is of type 〈c, 〈i, θ〉〉,
then JαβKc,i = JαKc,i(λi. JβKc,i)
c. Character F.A.:
If α is of type 〈c, 〈i, 〈ciθ, γ〉〉〉 and β is of type 〈c, 〈i, θ〉〉,
then JαβKc,i = JαKc,i(λc. λi. JβKc,i)
The second is the typeshifting rule that ‘diagonalizes’ the character of ‘Porky is clean’:50
50Here is a potential overgeneration worry: Consider sentences of the form ’Mary believes that S1 and S2’,
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(58) Diagonalization along threshold function:
If E is a sentence with character χ, then4E has the character4χ = λc. λi. χ(c[s(i)])(i),
where c[s(i)] is just like c except that its threshold function is replaced by that of
i.
Here I borrow Anand’s (2006, p.110) very useful idea that the diagonalization operation
can target specific coordinate(s) of the formal contexts and the circumstances of eval-
uation.51 Suppose we put the speaker coordinates back into our formal contexts and
circumstances of evaluation. Here is one way to see what the rule does. Let’s suppose
that ‘Porky is clean and I am a pet owner’ is uttered by Ann the pet owner at c1. The
operation extracts from the character of that sentence a proposition whose truth value at a
circumstance of evaluation depends on the threshold value of ‘clean’ at that circumstance
and on whether Ann — rather than that circumstance’s speaker — is a pet owner in the
world of that circumstance. Let’s call that proposition the diagonal proposition anchored to
(the speaker and the world of) c1. The operation then substitutes that proposition for the hor-
izontal proposition of the sentence’s character at c1. Since there is nothing special about
c1, the operation does the same thing for every arbitrary formal context c, that is, it sub-
stitutes the diagonal proposition anchored to c for the horizontal proposition of ‘Porky is
clean and I am a pet owner’ at c.
To see the need for this rule, suppose Ann utters in c1 ‘Mary believes that Porky
is clean and I am a pet owner’, intending the private-standard reading. The desired
interpretation of Ann’s utterance can be paraphrased into ‘Mary believes that Porky is
clean by her own standard and Ann is a pet owner’. We can obtain this interpretation by
simply having ‘believe’ take as inputs Mary and the diagonal proposition anchored to c1.
If we combine ‘believe’ with the plain diagonal proposition of ‘Porky is clean and I am
a pet owner’, we’ll get the odd reading on which the content of ‘I’ varies across Mary’s
(centered) belief worlds. This is why we need a diagonalization operation that targets the
threshold function only.
By using the lexical entries, the function application rule, and the diagonalization rule
above, we can derive the public-standard reading and the private-standard reading of
SPorky in the following way (The reader can skip ahead without much loss):
(59) The public-standard reading:
a. Jpos cleanKc,i
= Jpos≥Kc,i(λc. λi. JcleanKc,i) = λx. clean(c)(i)(x) ≥ s(c)(JcleanK)
(Note: We can write λc. λi. JcleanKc,i as JcleanK.)
[pos & clean, Character F.A.]
b. JPorky pos cleanKc,i
= Jpos cleanKc,i(JPorkyKc,i) = clean(c)(i)(p) ≥ s(c)(JcleanK)
[(a) & Porky, Extension F.A.]
c. JMary believes Porky pos cleanKc,i
= JbelieveKc,i(λi. JPorky pos cleanKc,i)(JMaryKc,i)
= λx. ∀i′[i′R(x)(i)→ clean(c)(i′)(p) ≥ s(c)(JcleanK)](JMaryKc,i)
[(b) & believe, Intension F.A.]
= ∀i′[i′R(m)(i)→ clean(c)(i′)(p) ≥ s(c)(JcleanK)]
[Extension F.A.]
(60) The private-standard reading:
a. J4(Porky pos clean)Kc,i
= clean(c[s(i)])(i)(p) ≥ s(c[s(i)])(JcleanK)
[Diagonalization (58) on (59-b)]
= clean(c)(i)(p) ≥ s(c[s(i)])(JcleanK)
[‘clean’ has a constant character]
where both S1 and S2 contain gradable adjectives (in their positive forms). If the typeshifting rule targets
sentences, then it predicts mixed readings where the positive forms in S1 are shifted and those in S2 are not
shifted, and vice versa. In case we want to block such mixed readings, we can modify the lexical meaning of
‘believe’ and typeshift ‘believe’ instead of sentences (4 refers to the diagonalization operation stated in (58)):
(i) JbelieveKc,i = λp〈c,it〉. λx. ∀i′[i′R(x)(i)→ p(c)(i′) = 1]
(ii) Jbelievetypeshi f tedKc,i
= λp〈c,it〉. λx. JbelieveK(4p)(x)
= λp〈c,it〉. λx. ∀i′[i′R(x)(i)→ 4p(c)(i′) = 1]
51To account for the phenomenon in Amharic that ‘John says that I am a hero’ has a de se reading on which
‘I’ denotes John, and that the denotations of other indexicals never shift under a say-context, Anand (2006)
proposes a diagonalization operation that targets the speaker coordinate.
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= clean(c)(i)(p) ≥ s(i)(JcleanK)
[The threshold function of c[s(i)] is identical to that of i]
b. JMary believes 4(Porky pos clean)Kc,i
= JbelieveKc,i(λi. J4(Porky pos clean)Kc,i)(JMaryKc,i)
= λx. ∀i′[i′R(x)(i)→ clean(c)(i′)(p) ≥ s(i′)(JcleanK)](JMaryKc,i)
[(a) & believe, Intension F.A.]
= ∀i′[i′R(m)(i)→ clean(c)(i′)(p) ≥ s(i′)(JcleanK)]
[Extension F.A.]
We can verify that the public-standard reading (59-c) is true at formal context c and cir-
cumstance of evaluation i just in case Porky’s degree of cleanness at every circumstance
of evaluation (or centered world) i′ compatible with Mary’s beliefs at i is at least as high
as the threshold value for ‘clean’ at c, i.e. s(c)(JcleanK), and that the private-standard
reading (60-b) is true at formal context c and circumstance of evaluation i just in case, for
every circumstance of evaluation (or centered world) i′ compatible with Mary’s beliefs at
i, Porky’s degree of cleanness at i′ is at least as high as the threshold value for ‘clean’ at
i′, i.e. s(i′)(JcleanK).
8.3 Comparison with the previous analysis
It is easy to see why the present account avoids unwanted truth-conditions. There are only
two ways to interpret SPorky: Either we diagonalize on the embedded sentence (i.e. Porky
is clean) and get the private-standard reading, or we don’t and get the public-standard
reading.
The present analysis is also not vulnerable to the analogue of our objection to the
theory of pragmatic halo. On this analysis, when the private-standard reading is as-
serted, the clean-threshold-function(s) is determined solely by the doxastic state of the
belief subject (which we represent as a set of centered worlds each of which contains a
threshold function as one of its coordinates). Since the context does not determine any
clean-threshold, the issue whether it determines a clean-threshold(s) that matches with
the clean-standard(s) of the belief subject does not arise.
The present analysis looks promising. But one may worry that the diagonalization
operation it uses violates Kaplan’s famous prohibition against monsters. The main mo-
tivation of Kaplan’s prohibition is that the content of an expression should always be a
function of its parts’ contents, which can’t be true if there are operations that require the
content of an expression to be computed based on one of its parts’ character.52 Kaplan
calls those operations ‘monsters’. My account of the private-standard reading violates
Kaplan’s ban because the content of SPorky is computed based on the diagonal proposition
of ‘Porky is clean’, which we can’t obtain without operating on the character of ‘Porky is
clean’.
I do not have the space to respond to this worry here because the issue whether there
are sufficiently strong empirical and theoretical reasons to uphold Kaplan’s ban is com-
plex.53 So a full evaluation of the costs of this analysis must be left for future work.
9 Conclusion
This paper posed a challenge to the absolutist analysis of maximal standard gradable ad-
jectives (GAmax), on which GAmax require their arguments to have the maximal degree
of the properties they express. We saw that the result of embedding Rotstein and Win-
ter’s belief sentence inside a belief context has two coherent-belief readings besides the
contradictory-belief reading; that the absolutist can’t use Lasersohn’s theory of pragmatic
halos to account for both readings satisfactorily; and that if the absolutist uses Sassoon
and Toledo’s local absolutism and granularity shift to account for those readings, they
face the Porky-Tom problem and are hard-pressed to provide the licensing conditions for
granularity shifts. I showed that we can plausibly account for the coherent-belief read-
ings by adopting Kennedy and McNally’s typology of the scale structures of gradable
adjectives; holding that the contextual thresholds for GAnax are not determined by the
economy principle but by the tradeoff between informativity maximalization and Qual-
ity; and adopting either the world-variable-based analysis we considered in §7 or the
monstrous analysis we just considered.
52See Zimmermann (2013) and Rabern (2013) for helpful definitions of Kaplan’s ban against monsters.
53For relevant discussions, see Kaplan (1989), Lewis (1980), Schlenker (2003), Anand and Nevins (2004), Anand
(2006), Ninan (2010), Santorio (2012), Zimmermann (2013), Rabern (2013), Stalnaker (2014), Rabern and Ball
(2017), Santorio (2019).
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I have not considered all the data that could be used to support the truth conditions de-
termined by the economy principle. For example, McNally (2011) reports that for-phrases
and compared-to phrases typically can’t be used to modify GAmax. She points out that
the economy principle provides a straightforward explanation for that phenomenon: Since
the contextual threshold is always endpoint-oriented, information about which compari-
son classes are contextually salient can’t have any effect on the interpretations of GAmax.
Whether we can explain that phenomenon without using the economy principle is an
issue that must be explored in future research.54
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